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PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE CHANGES FOR KENTUCKY AS RECOMMENDED IN THE REPORT IN 1934

OF THE KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION'S
COMMITTEE ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDUJRE OF THE AIMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE.
By JOHN A. GEYER

AND GEORGE T. SmNNEIxR

"Crime is one of our major problems. Petty misdemeanors
are probably decreasing but major crimes, such as murder,
bank robberies, and kidnaping, have grown to alarming proportions. It has been estimated that an inhabitant of the United
States is murdered every forty-five minutes; more than ten
persons per year for each one hundred thousand inhabitants as
compared with the English murder rate of about one person for
each two hundred thousand inhabitants. We no longer have
to contend merely -with individual criminals acting alone or
with small gangs of toughs. Probably eighty per cent of the
serious crimes are the results of the activities of groups of wellorganized criminals who carry on one or more of the numerous
rackets. Their business is to levy tribute upon honest citizens
by threats of death or serious property damage; threats which
their victims know only too well that they are capable of executing.
"In this war on crime, leadership is the privilege and duty of the
legal profession. It is to the legal profession to whom the public has
a right to look for guidance of criminal research in the field of criminal
justice.",

Of course, the present unfortunate conditions of crime are
* This study is published in cooperation with the Committee of
The Kentucky State Bar Association on the Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute. Resolution No. 7, adopted by the
Attorney General's Crime Conference held in Washington, Dec. 10th,
recommends to all legislatures a careful consideration of this Model
Code of Criminal Procedure. The committee in Kentucky is now in its
third year and has made two reports to the Bar Association.
** A. B., Kentucky.
1
: "Scientific Research in the Fields of Criminal Justice," talk
broadcast by William Draper Lewis, Director of the American Law
Institute, on Nov. 10, 1934 over the Columbia Broadcasting System as
the sixth in a series of twelve programs entitled "The Lawyer and the
Public" presented by the American Bar Association under the auspices
of the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education."
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crjeated by many factors; but those factors with which the legal
profession is primarily interested are personnel, administration,
and procedure of the criminal system. It has been said that
these- three factors "rank in the order named with respect to

their influence upon the results achieved.

'2

In regard to these factors the American Law Institute has
restated the criminal law in a manner to promote its greater
certainty, and has produced a model code of criminal procedure
which, if adopted, "will remove many of the existing just complaints of the unnecessary technicalities and delays in the ad3
ministration of the criminal law."
Virtually every one of the provisions of the American Law
Institute's Model Code is in force in some jurisdiction either in
identical language, or in substance, and many of them are in
force in a large number of jurisdictions. "The Code istherefore a discriminating selection from a large body of law that has
been approved by experience.'' 4 A summary of the Code's
chief provision is as follows:
"1. The Code facilitates the arrest of suspected persons by providing that a warrant of arrest may be served by any peace officer,
and that he need not be in possession of the warrant at the time of
the arrest.
"2. The provisions relating to bail requireadequate and effective
security for the appearance of the-defendant at the trial. This prevents the pernicious practice of 'straw-bail.'
"3. In about half the States of the country a defendant may be
prosecuted upon an information sworn to by a prosecuting officer.
This method of prosecution, as compared with prosecution by indictment, is less expensive, more expeditious, and more efficient. The
Code provides that all offenses may be prosecuted by information as
well as by indictment.
"4. One of the potent causes of the miscarriage of justice in
criminal cases is the extreme technicality required in the indictment.
The proposed Code abolishes fhese technicalities.
"5. In many States the defendant may not waive a jury trial and
elect to be tried by the judge. The Code permits that the jury may
be waived by the defendant in all cases except where a sentence of
death may be imposed.
"6. The Code provides that jurors shall be examined as to their
qualifications by the judge. This prevents the inordinate delay which
frequently results in selecting a jury in a case which has been widely
advertised in the newspapers.
"7. It sometimes occurs that a mistrial results from the fact
that a juror dies or is discharged for some reason during the course
of the proceedings. The Code provides that where a trial is likely to
2 11 Nebraska Law Review 221, (223).
3American Law Institute Proceedings, Volume III, 492..
4 Supra, 11 Neb. L. R. 221, (223).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
be protracted, the court may order alternate jurors to be called, one
of whom may take the place of any juror who dies or is discharged.
"8. The Code provides that in criminal cases where the issue
of insanity is raised the court may appoint disinterested medical witnesses to examine the accused and to testify at the trial. By such
practice unbiased and non-partisan testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition is presented to the jury.
"9. The requirement of law that a person could n6t be convicted
of a crime unless all twelve jurors concurred in finding him guilty
results yearly in hundreds of so-called mistrials. The proposed Code
provides that In all except trials for capital offenses, a verdict may be
rendered by ten jurors in felonies 5in the case of serious offenses and
by eight jurors in minor offenses."r

According t6 the latest Report of the Kentucky Committee on the Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute,0 certain of the model provisions, fifteen in number, have
been recommended for adoption in Kentucky. It is the purpose
of the authors of the present paper to indicate that these provisions have decided advantages over the present practice as
governed by the Kentucky Code of Criminal Procedure.
Each of the recommended sections follows with separate
discussion
SECTION

4. DIRECTION AND EXECUTION 0p WARRANT.

The Kentucky Criminal Code section 27 provides that "a
warrant of arrest shall . . . command the officer to whom it is
directed to arrest the person named therein as the offender.. ."
This section of the Kentucky Code also indicates the form for
the warrant: "The Commonwealth of Kentucky to any shekiff,
constable, coroner, jailer, marshal, or policeman of the State of
Kentucky. .. ." According to the indicated form the warrant
is-directed to any peace officer, but the section itself speaks of
the officer to whom it is directed. It .necessarily follows that a
peace officer may execute the warrant only in his county.7
This section of the Kentucky Code is insufficient for two
reasons. First, the localized effect gives the culprit too great
an opportunity for escape. Under our present system, except in
the adjoining counties, if a fugitive escapes into X county,
the warrant would have to be returned to the justice and a new
one issued to the X county; but if in the meantime the fugitive
r Op cit., "Scientific Research in the Fields of Criminal Justice".
6 1934 Proceedings of Kentucky State Bar Association, page 225.
York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 (1884).
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had slipped into Y county, a new warrant would have to be obtained. An adroit fugitive would have all the time and chance
of escape he should desire.
'Ofcourse, the situation is cared for to a slight extent by
section 36, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code, which states
that the peace officer, "when in actual pursuit of an offender,
may cross a county line for the purpose of making the arrest
in the adjoining county." Therefore, even though the officer
may pursue into adjoining counties, he is limited to them and
them only when in "hot" pursuit.
Secondly, as a converse of reason one, arrest should be facilitated to meet modern conditions. Our present method is as
antiquated as that monstrosity, the horse and buggy, for which
it was adaptable. However, with our modern fast means of
transportation and paved roads, county lines have been brought
closer together. We'.have improved scientific means of capturing the fugitive in the radio, as for instance station WPET, Lexington police radio station. In step with such unification, the
execution of the warrant should be given state-wide application.
The American Law Institute Code section 4 would give us
such unification by removing, in effect, boundaries of counties
in the execution of the warrant:
"The warrant shall be directed to all peace officers in the State. It
shall be executed only by a peace officer, and may be executed in any
county by any peace officer in the state."

Method of arrest by offiaer by virtue of warrant. The A.
L. I. Code provides in Section 24:
"When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the
fact that a warrant has been- issued for his arrest, except when he
flees or forcibly resists before the officer has the opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest, but after the arrest if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable."

The Kentucky Code provides that "a peace officer may
nake an arrest in obedience to a warrant of arrest delivered to
him" s and "if required shall show the warrant." 9 The difference between the two code provisions is that concerning the
possession of the warrant at the time of the arrest.
8Carroll's Ky. Code of Crim. Prac. sec. 36, subsee. 1.

'Carroll's Ky. Code of Crim. Prac. sec. 39.
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In Wright v. Comononweathl° the court said, "not even a
peace officer is authorized to make an arrest without a warrant
issued and delivered to him, except when a public offence is committed in his presence, or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony."
Under the provisions of the Kentucky Code and the decisions of the courts it is apparent that the person to be arrested,
the officer making the arrest and the warrant must be in the
same place at the same time.
The impracticability of -such a rule especially in misdemeanors can be illustrated by a Michigan case People v.
McLean." In this case a warrant had been issued for the arrest
of X upon a charge of assault and battery. The warrant was
handed to the sheriff who showed it to his deputy P. The sheriff
then ordered P to go to one place while he himself went to another, the sheriff keeping the warrant in his possession. P
found Mvi and approached him" to make the arrest informing M
that he had a warrant and expressing his intention to arrest M.
lv/ resisted and when he was subsequently taken into custody was
charged with resisting a duly authorized officer. The court in
reversing a conviction in the trial court said that regardless of
the directiong of the sheriff the deputy was not in such jroximity to the sheriff as would justify a holding that the deputy was
in possession of the warrant, for "a warrant for a misdemeanor
cannot lawfully be held by two officers at once when they are mot
together. "
2
The difficulty becomes very apparent in a city of any size.'
Any patrolman or detective might encounter the wanted man,
but unless he had the warrant in his possession he would be unable to make the arrest. Either there must be one warrant
and one man out of many legally able to make an arrest, or
there must be a warrant for every officer seeking the individual.
It is submitted that an expeditious arrest can best be accom1685 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904 (1887). Accord: Bates v. Commonwealth,
13 K. L. R. 132, 16 S. W. 451 (1891); Simmons V. Commonwealth, 203
Ky. 621, 262 S. W. 972 (1924).
68 Mich. 480, 36 N. W. 231 (1888)
"Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest (1929) 29 Mich.
Law Review 448.

PROPOSED CRimixAni

CODE CHA2NGES FOB KENTUCKY

435

plished where there is but one warrant issued and this is held
at headquarters or the station and then the various patrolmen
and detectives are notified that the warrant has been issued and
are told to bring in the person named in the warrant.
Section 37.

RIGHT Op ATTORNEY TO VISIT PERSON ARRESTED.

Any attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the court of this state
shall, at the request of the person or of some one acting in his behalf,
be permitted, under reasonable regulations, to visit the person arrested.

Kentucky has no similar provision in the Criminal Code.
However, there is a section of the Code which states that "The
magistrate, before commencing the examination, shall state the
charge, and require of the defendant whether he desires the
aid of counsel, and shall allow a reasonable opportunity for procuring it." But how long before the commencing of the examination shall the request of the person arrested be heard? That
question is not answered by the Code.
Yet it is a general practice in the state to permit attorneys
to visit prisoners under reasonable regulations. Should we not
have a statutory basis for this practice? Otherwise, it is quite
possible that the present discretion of the jailer or police in allowing attorneys to visit the accused will result in holding the
person illegally in jail, when he is in fact innocent, because of
his ignorance of the law, the presumption that everyone knows

the law notwithstanding. The discretion of the officer holding
the person accused should be removed so as to allow the free
exercise of a right recognized by the courts of the person arrested to have benefit of counsel.
Also, under the constitution, every person arrested is entitled to a speedy trial. With this provision allowing an attorney to visit the accused, the attorney could take immediate
action in habeas corpus proceedings if the person arrested is innocent and is being held unduly. Not only would the speed
of trial be beneficial to the arrested person, but it would be favorable to the interest of the state in the practical way of deceased costs of providing for the person arrested, and in the
way of public policy.

Section 40. WAivER op ExA Nn±iON.
(1).

The defendant may waive a preliminary examination.

If
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he does waive, the magistrate shall hold him to answer and shall
either admit him to bail or commit him to custody as provided in
section 55.
(2). Notwithstanding a waiver of examination by the defendant,
however, the magistrate, on his own motion may, or on the demand
of the prosecuting attorney, shall examine, the witnesses for the Commonwealth and have their testimony reduced to writing or taken in
shorthand by a stenographer and transcribed. After hearing the testimony, if it appears that there is not probable cause to believe the defendant guilty of any offense, the magistrate shall order that he be
discharged.

There is no similar provision in the Kentucky Criminal
Code. Altho there is no statutory justification for waiver of
preliminary examination in Kentucky, such waiver is a generally recognized practice. It frequently happens that the attorney representing the defendant will make the statement to the
examining court that he desires to waive the examining trial,
and when the examining trial is waived, the defendant is held
to the grand jury and his bond fixed at*such amount as the
court may think proper. It sometimes happens, where an examining trial is waived, that evidence is heard for the purpose
of fixing the amount of bail. Therefore, Kentucky recognizes
that the preliminary examination is a privilege personal to the
accused, and that it is not an integral and fundamental part of
our judicial system. It would make for stability and unity if
this practice of waiver were given a statutory basis. Since
it is admitted that waiver of preliminary examination is a
part of our practice, then there can be no objection to the
introduction of the American Law Institute provision 40 into
our Code if this provision adequately meets the purposes and
privileges connected with preliminary examination and its
waiver.
In no sense is a preliminary examisation a trial for the
purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
If this were the object of the examination, it would be quite obvious that the defendant should not be allowed the privilege of
waiving this part of the procedure. The main reasons for having a preliminary hearing may be summarized as follows: (1)
to inquire whether a crime has been committed; (2) to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence for probable cause that
the accused is guilty; (3) to protect the person charged from

A
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open and public accusations; (4) to avoid the expense of public
trials; (5) to perpetuate testimony then given; (6) to determine
the amount of bail in bailable cases in order to insure the presence of the defendant. In other words, a preliminary examination is simply "a course of procedure whereby a possible abuse
of power may be prevented, and the accused discharged or held
to answer, as the facts warrant."' 13 The above six purposes of
the preliminary examination will be satisfactorily met by the
American Law Institute Code section 40.
By waiving a preliminary examination the defendant is
giving up his right in numbers one and two of the above stated
reasons for preliminary examination, since by so waiving the
defendant is considered as admitting that the testimony, if
taken, would be sufficient to establish probable cause for belief
in the guilt of the accused.
The third listed reason, viz., to protect the person charged
from public accusation, is 8olely for the benefit of the defendant.
If the defendant had full knowledge and appreciation of this
right, should he not be allowed to relinquish it ?
Reason four, viz.: to avoid the expense of public trial, is obviously accounted for by the very provision for waiver itself.
If the defendant knows that he is innocent, he of course will
take advantage of the preliminary examination.
Reason 5 is provided for, in that subsection two of section
40 states that "notwithstanding waiver of examination by the
defendant, . . . the magistrate, on his own motion, may,. or on
demand of the prosecuting attorney shall examine the witnesses
for the Commonwealth; and have their testimony reduced to
writing or taken in shorthand by a stenographer and transcribed." Perpetuation of the testimony is thus provided for in
spite of the waiver by the defendant. This provision is quite essential. To illustrate, in Commonwealth v. Keck 14 an eye-witness
of a homicide testified at the preliminary examination and died
before the trial. If, in such a case, the State, upon learning of
the fatal condition of the witness, were not allowed to hold a
"SState v. Langford, 293 Mo. 436, 240 S. W. 167, (168),
l,148 Pa. 639, 24 At. 161, (1892).

(1922).
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hearing in spite of the defendant's waiver of the preliminary
examination, vital evidence could not have been procured.
Reason 6, concerning bail, is provided for by the American
Law Institute Code provision. The section states that "the
Magistrate shall hold the accused to answer, and shall either
admit him to bail or commit him to custody."
Thus the American Law Institute Code provision adequately meets the needs and purposes of preliminary examination
and, with particular reference to waiver, will provide a statutory basis, if adopted, for a generally recognized practice.
TESTImONY OF WITNESSES AND DEPOSITIONS ADmIISILE AT

TRiAL

The A. L.I. Code provides:
Section 51. The testimony of the witnesses and of the defendant,

if he testified shall either be reduced to writing by the magistrate or
under his direction, or be taken in shorthand by a stenographer and
transcribed. The magistrate shall give the defendant an opportunity
to sign his deposition.
Section 53. (1) In case the defendant testified his deposition if
signed by him, shall be admissible in evidence against him at the
trial without further authentication. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent the Commonwealth from giving in evidence at the trial any
admission or confession or other statement of the defendant made at
any time which by law is admissible as evidence against such person.
(2) When a witness has been examined as provided in section
46 (All witnesses shall be examined in presence of the defendant and
may be cross-examined.) and his testimony taken as provided in
section 51, his deposition may be admitted in evidemce upon the trial
of the defendant for the offense for which he is held, either on behalf
of the Commonwealth or the defendant, if for any reason the testimony of the witness cannot be obtained at the trial and the court is
satisfied that the inability to procure such testimony is not due to the
fault of the party offering it.

Section 64 of the Kentucky Code provides "The magistrate
in the minutes of the examination shall state the name and place
of residence of each -witness examined, and the substance of his
testimony. But such statement shall not of itself be evidence
for any purpose." - Part 1 of Section 53 is offered as giving a
mutual advantage to both parties in a criminal trial, without
any violence to the present rules of evidence. The testimony of
a defendant is admissible, if it can be proved, whether it is in
writing or not. The difference lies in the fact that there is a
strong indication that the signed statement is correct. The other
one has to be proved like any other admission. Therefore, there
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is an advantage to the prosecution in having this written statement by the defendant. There is also an advantage to the defendant in that he is protected against the ordinary faked up
written statement not signed by him that so often is produced
by the police authorities after the arrest is made.' 5
In Wilson v. (ommonwealth,16 it is said that "an officer
may refresh his recollection from the minutes and then state,
when his recollection was refreshed, what the testimony was, if
he could." This was permitted even though it seems the person
who made the statement was in court at the time. But it has
been held that where the testimony at the examining trial was
taken down and afterwards transcribed by an official stenographer, and the witness died before trial, such stenographer could
read the testimony as transcribed at the trial. 17 There is a
dictum in O'Brian v. Oommonweatth,18 to the effect that testimony given on the preliminary examination is admissible at the
trial if the witness is dead. Evidence of a witness in the examining trial, who died before trial in the circuit court, was admitted
when narrated by those who recollected the testimony of the dead
witness. 19 'Where a witness who testified in the first trial of a
defendant, subsequently became insane and so continued up to
the time of the second trial, it was held permissible to prove
what the witness said on the first trial. 20 The situation in Kentucky then is this: If the witness is dead stenographic notes
may be read, or if the witness is dead or insane, his testimony
at a previous proceeding may be proved at the second by persons narrating the testimony they heard.
The A. L. I. Code provisions allow the introduction of the
statements on the examining trial if for any reason the witness
cannot be present and if it is not the fault of the party wishing
to introduce the statement. In a Texas case 2 ' the court said
"We are unable to appreciate any good reason why the people
: The American Law Institute Proceedings, Vol. VIII p. 83.
:21 K. L. R. 1333, 54 S. W. 946 (1900).
1T
Moore v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 405, 136 S. W. 608 (1911).
8 6 Bush 563, 571 (1869).
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 14 K. L. R. 288, 20 S. W. 226 (1892).
Walkup v. Commonwealth, 14 K. L. R. 337, 20 S. W. 221 (1892).
-Harris v. state, 71 Tex. Cr. Rep. 463, 160 S. W. 447 (1913).
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or respondent should have the benefit of such evidence in cases
-where the witness is dead,... and be denied that benefit where
the witness is . ..ill. In all .. . cases the important fact is
identical... the witness cannot be produced in person to testify
before the jury."
As long as the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine any witness at the examining trial it is submitted that
his rights have been amply protected. In lWaZkzp v. Commonwealth22 it was said "The testimony of a deceased witness given
in an action between the same parties is admissible. The reason
is, that it has been given under oath and with an opportunity
for cross-examination. The tests of truth are not absent, and
the reasons that apply in such a case are equally applicable to
one where a witness has, after testifying become insane." Testimony of a witness who is ill or absent for any reason not attributable to the party wishing to introduce such evidence does
not seem to be changed in any way by the reason for the absence
of the witness.
It is true that the Kentucky Constitution 23 provides that
the defendant shall have the right to meet the witnesses against
"him fave to face." It is submitted that the important purpose
of this provision is to assure the accused of an opportunity to
cross-examine those witnesses appearing against him. And if he
has had that opportunity at the preliminary examination it does
not seem as if any of his rights will be infringed upon if the
recorded testimony of absent witnesses is admitted on his trial
as provided in Section 53 of the A. L. I. Code. It is recommended that Kentucky adopt these two sections of the A. L. I.
Code so that evidence duly taken before a judicial body shall
not be forever lost to the determination of a case.
JUSTIPICATION OP SURETIES.

In section 79 of the A. L. I. Code the following provision
is made:
Each surety shall justify by affidavit that he possesses the qualifications prescribed by sections 75 and 78, and shall in such affidavit describe the property in respect to which he proposes to justify as to his
sufficiency, stating the encumbrances thereon, by mortgage, judgment,
= 14 K. L. R. 337, 338, 20 S. W. 221 (1892).
= Constitution of Kentucky, Sec. 11.
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or otherwise, and the amount and the number of undertakings, if any,
entered into by him and remaining undischarged.

The Kentucky Code is lacking in the details of the justification of sureties. Section 76 of the Kentucky Code provides
that the sureties shall be residents of the Commonwealth, owners of visible property, over and above that exempt from execution, to the sum in which bail is required, and shall be worth
that amount after the paymnent of their debts and liabilities.
In Kentucky after a surety has justified in accordance with
our present regulations it is impossible to learn from the affidavit what particular piece or pieces of property were scheduled.
It is impossible to learn if the property upon which the
surety purported to justify is worth the amount of the bail bond
if the property is unencumbered, much less to ascertain its value
if it has an encumbrance upon it. Under the present situation
all that is available as a fact is the surety's statement that he
has property. It seems that in order to even convict the surety
of perjury it would be necessary to prove that he not only did
not possess a certain piece of property, but that he did not
possess any property.
The A- L. I. Code provision demands, first, a description of
the particular property; and, second, a statement concerning
encumbrances, and, if there are any, the kind and the amount of
such outstanding encumbrances. Third, a statement must be
made by the surety concerning the number and amount of any
other undertakings entered into by him that remain undischarged.
By requiring a description of the property and a listing
of all encumbrances it is possible for the court to ascertain if
that property in its present state is sufficient for the particular
undertaking in question if there are no undiseharged undertakings upon the same property. If there are undischarged
undertakings they must be deducted from the value of the property in relation to the particular undertaking at hand.
It would be impossible for a person to be accepted "on
$100,000 face value of bonds upon a showing that he owned a
half interest in property valued at $25,000 and mortgaged for
$11,500."24 Under the regulations provided in the A. L. I.
21
Waite, Code of Criminal Procedure: The Problem of Bail (1929)
15 A. B. A. . 71.
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Code that individual's property would be surety for only
$13,500 and no more. When his undertakings had reached that
figure he would no longer be accepted as surety on undertakings
until some or all of the previous undertakings had been discharged.
In an effort to eliminate irresponsible bondsmen and uncollectible bonds it is submitted that this section should be
adopted in Kentucky. It is necessary that the exact status of
the property of every bondsman be known at the time that a
particular bail bond undertaking is entered into, and this section of the A. L. I. Code makes this possible.
PR FESSIONAL BOw

siEN ANDIREGISTRATION.

The A. Ti. I. Code has the following sections, one defining
a professional bondsman and the second providing for registration of professional bondsmen:
Section 80. When a person other than a .surety company has become a surety for the release of a person on bail and has received
compensation therefor in more than two undertakings on neither of
which he has been discharged from liability, he is a professional bondsman.
Section 81. A professional bondsman shall not become surety on
an undertaking unless he has been registered as a professional bondsman in the office of........................ ; and any such bondsman who offers
himself as a surety without having so registered shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding ........................ or
fined not exceeding ........................ or both in the discretion of the court.

There are no sections in the Kentucky Code which regulate the activities of professional bondsmen as a class.
Originally, as a rule, the bondsman was a personal friend
of the accused, incurring the liability as a matter of accommodation. 25 But now the personal element has largely been
supplanted in many cases by the commercial, or monetary element. It is, perhaps, inevitable that such should be the case.
It is .often very difficult, and at times impossible, for an accused
person to obtain a friend who is willing to go bail. In such
situations the professional bondsman is a necessary element in
our bail system, unless we desire that those persons unable to
obtain a friend as bail shall languish in jail.
The business of giving bail goes to the very roots of the
26The Professional Bondsman (1916) 83 Central Law Journal 445.
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system and there is afforded many opportunities for improper
practices which affect the efficient administration of justice. It
may be argued that professional bondsmen are 'an evil and
foreign to our theory of bail. But at the same time it seems as
if they have become an intricate part of our system which cannot be done away with without at the same time bringing about
some other unwanted situation. Therefore, it seems that a regulation of professional bondsmen as a class should be provided
so that they may be kept under the scrutiny of the court.
The A. L. I. Code provides as to contracts to indemnify
sureties:
Section 85. Every surety for the release of any person on bail
shall file with the undertaking an affidavit stating whether or not he
or anyone for his use has been promised or has received any security
or consideration for his undertaking; and if so, the nature and the
amount thereof, and the name of the person by whom such promise
was made or from whomn such security or consideration was received.
Any wilful misstatement in such affidavit or any intentional omission
to set forth in the affidavit all the security or consideration promised
or given shall render the person making it subject to the same penalty
as one who commits perjury. An action to enforce any indemnity
agreement shall not be in favor of the surety against such indemnitor,
except with respect to the agreements set forth in such affidavit. In
an action by the indemnitor against the surety to recover any collateral
or security given by the indemnitor such surety shall have the right
to retain only such security or collateral as is mentioned in the affidavit
required above.

Kentucky has no code or statutory provision concerning
this point, but there has been an expression in judicial decision.
In Ratcliffe v. Svit 2 6 the plaintiff who had been let out on bail
upon the defendant's becoming his bondsman, brought an action
in equity to have his title restored to certain property which
had been the consideration in a contract between the parties
whereby the bondsmen agreed to allow the accused to leave the
state. It was held that a contract between a principal and his
surety on a bail bond to indemnify the surety against loss is unlawful and against public policy and will neither be enforced
in law nor will an executed contract resting on such consideration be relieved, against in equity. Thus, it is seen that Kentucky disproves of contracts of indemnity where the purpose
is to provide a means by which the accused may flee from
justice. But the Kentucky case did not settle the question
213 Bush 172 (1877).
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whether the contract would have been enforceable if there had
been no intention that the accused should escape.
The fact to be faced is that indemnity contracted for in the
great majority of cases is not one of full and complete restitution. Ordinarily the surety is paid a certain fee which is only
a small percentage of the amount of the bond .itself. According
to our theory of bail the surety is a friend of the accused and
goes his bail as a gesture of friendship and, accommodation. The
fact is that in a great number of cases the accused does not have
a friend who is willing or able to provide the proper amount of
bail. In such a situation the accused must either languish in
jail or pay a fee to a professional bondsman in order to obtain
his liberty. If the fee is paid there is in effect a contract made
and executed whereby the surety is indemnified against loss.
It is true that in this particular instance if the accused does not
appear for trial he iq not completely indemnified, but when a
bondsman is surety on a number of bonds he is protected from
loss much as an insurance company is. Therefore, we are faced
-with what may be admitted to be an evil in allowing any kind
or amount of indemnity, but we also must face the fact that in
the present day world it is necessary to have professional bondsman, although they are clearly inconsistent with the theory of
bail.
It does not appear to be a rash assumption that courts will
not permit an affidavit to pass which calls for an unreasonable
amount of indemnity. Certainly if an unreasonable amount
is called for, some suspicion must be aroused as to the intentions
of theparties. If a bondsman realizes that his recovery is to
be based upon the facts set forth in his affidavit it seems as if
he will be more vigilant in seeing that the accused is present
for trial. Instead of a tendency to increase the number who
will not appear for trial, such a provision as Section 85 will
have just the opposite tendency. It is submitted that it is better to regulate even a supposedly evil practice, if it is impractical
to eradicate it than to completely ignore it and pretend it is
non-existent.
UNDERTAKING

A LIEN.

The A. L. I. Code provides in section 102:
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The undertaking shall be a lien on any real property described in
the- affidavit required by section 79 from the time of the recording of
such undertaking and affidavit in the county in which the property is
situated. Upon the filing of the order with the (title of the official
whose duty it is to record instruments which are liens should be inserted) of the county where the property is situated cancelling the
undertaking the lien shall be discharged.

The Kentucky Code contains no similar provision.
This section is recommended in an effort to assure the collectibility of forfeited bail. Of course an arrangement whereby
the amount of bail would be deposited in cash would be ideal
as far as assuring collectibility is concerned. But this would
make it very difficult to get bail on many where release should
be granted. To this end it has been suggested that where the
release is on bond it must be secured by a lien on specific real
estate. Then as a necessary complement it must be shown by
the bondsman that the real estate he offers as security has a net
value over and above all other liens sufficient to secure the bond.
27
Such an undertaking would have four things in its favor.
First, it would be assurance of the collectibility of the bond.

.Second, it would facilitate and expedite the collection of
forfeited bonds. To realize the importance of this point one
needs but to look at the reports on the poipt in various large
cities. Much of the failure to collect upon forfeited bonds is
caused by the cumbersomeness of the necessary procedure and
the preoccupation of the prosecutor's office, and not to the financial irresponsibility of the bondsman. By making every bond a
lien upon real estate there is a limit placed on the extent to
which a particular piece of property may be put up as security;
also, the disposal of the property would be hampered and the
owner would have an incentive to pay the amount and clear
the lien on his own initiative. Even in ease a compulsory payment is necessary the foreclosure could be more easily and
quickly accomplished than at present.
Third, since the bond is a lien upon the property there
would be a tendency towards expediting the setting of cases
for trial. Under existing conditions, if the bondsman can
pledge the same property for large amounts of bonds, he does
-wWaite, Code o1 Criminal Procedure: The Problem of Bail, 15
A. B. A. Jour. 71 (1929).

K. L. J.-4
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not care when a particular case comes for trial. He is not hampered by the delay. But with a lien attached to his property
he is naturally limited in the number of bonds by the value of
the property. Since his only opportunity for a profitable business is in a rapid turnover the bondsman will see to it that there
is little delay in the disposition of proceedings and so remove
the lien created by that bond thus enabling the bondsman
to provide for another. Even defense attorneys who are noted
for their dilatory tactics would be put under a certain amount
of pressure by the bondsman and be forced to proceed promptly.
Fourth, a bondsman having scheduled real estate as his necessary property would be unable to beat collection of a forfeiture by a hasty sale, for presumably the bond would have been
recorded and it would be a lien thereon.
TAKING INSUPPICIENT BAIL, AcCEPTING INSUFPICIENT OR
UNQUALIFIED

SURETIES.

Section 112 of the A. L. I. Code provides:
Any official who takes bail which he knows to be insufficient, or
accepts a surety in an undertaking knowing such surety not to possess
the qualifications of sufficiency required by law is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not exceeding ........................ or fined not
exceeding ........................ or both at the discretion of the court.

Kentucky has no provision of a similar nature, but it seems
that such a provision would have a beneficial effect in the administration of bail bonds. In the past judges have not insisted
upon financially responsible bondsmen and there is no reason
to believe that they will do so in the future. In an effort to
remedy this evil it is recommended that some means be adopted
to impress upon the proper officials the importance of their
duty in accepting sureties. Other sections of the A. L. I. Code
have been recommended in which simple standards are set up to
which sureties must conform before being acceptable. This section provides a means of making an officer responsible for his
dereliction of duty in accepting sureties which the law does not
permit him to accept.
This is not a wholly unprecedented procedure, for as far
back as the 13th century a statute declared that certain accused
persons might be "let out by replevin" and the method of pro-
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cedure to be pursued, provided "and if the sheriff, or any other,
let any go at large by surety, that is not replevisable.... he shall
lose his fee and office forever.' '28 A statute of 1554 after a recital of the disregard by justices of the laws permitting them
to "let to bail" declares that any justice of the peace who shall
"offend in anything contrary to the true intent and meaning"
of the law shall be punished by fine. 29
No judge could be expected to certify the responsibility of
sureties, but any judge can be expected to require that they
make whatever showing of responsibility the law requires that
they make. 30
WHEN TRIAL BY Juay MAY BE WAIVED.

Section 266 of the A. I. I.Code provides:
"In all cases except where a sentence of death may be imposed
trial by jury may be waived by the defendant. Such waiver shall be
made in open court and entered of record."

As a general proposition waiver of jury trial has several
noteworthy advantages. However inconsistent it may appear,
waiver is really an important safeguard to trial by jury. With
a decrease in the number of jurors, the quality of the jurors
should be improved. Of course the loss of time and money attributed to the jury system would be ended. Also there is a
psychological advantage, for "To choose a jury is one thing,
to be forced to take one is another." Those things which are
optional are more to be cherished than those which are compulsory. Another reason more apparent would be that the defendant may be saved from the passion of the jury, as in the LoebLeopold murder case. Also, even if not purely a reason, there
is the fact that a great use of waiver is made in states allowing
31
such-thus there is a practical indication of the adyantages.
Under the present condition of the Kentucky law in regard
to jury trial and its waiver, a jury may be waived in misdemeanor cases. Such practice is prevalent in spite of the constitutional provision that preserves and guarantees to one
2 3 Edw. I. c. 15; strengthened 27 Edw. I. c. 3.
9 1 and 2 Phillip and Mary, c. 13; Kelyng's Rep. 3.

Waite, Code of Criminal Procedure: The Problem of Bail. (1929)
15 A. B. A. J.71.
"16 Iowa L. R. 223. "Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases".

KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL

charged with crime the ancient mode of trial by jury.3 2
However, a statute precisely covers the situation. Kentucky
Statutes section 2252 permits the waiver of the right to jury
trial in all but felony cases.3 3 Yet it is significant that in the
cases before. 1925 allowing waiver of jury in misdemeanor cases
the statutory provision was not mentioned or used in the decisions.3 4 Such would indicate that in misdemeanor cases at
common law there was waiver of jury trial.
In regard to felony cases particularly, the case of Branham
v. Commonweath,3 5 was the first case to present the question
of waiver of jury in a situation involving a felony. It was there
held that a defendant charged with the commission of a felony
cannot waive his constitutional right to trial by jury, under
the Constitution section 7, and Kentucky Statutes section 2252.
Later Kentucky cases involving waiver of jury in a felony 3"
are based upon this decision. Thence in order to determine
the basis of non-waiver in felony cases we must analyze the
Branham Case and determine what was the real holding in that
case. According to the language of the court, the denial of
waiver of jury in a felony case is-based upon both the constitution and the statutory provision. In view of the presence of the
statute, the real basis obviously is the statute which expressly
prohibits waiver in felony cases. Thence the reference made to
the Kentucky Constitution is really obiter dictum.
Whether waiver would be allowed under the Constitution
in the -absence, or under a change, of section 2252 of the Kentucy Statutes has not yet been presented for decision. In
case section 2252 were repealed, the Kentucky courts would
be presented with this question which has been decided in
numerous jurisdictions. Generally, the question resolves itself
12Kentucky Constitution, section 7. "The ancient mode of trial
by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate,
subject to such modification as may be authorized by this Constitution."
3 Kentucky Statute 2252: "A petit jury in the circuit court shall
consist of twelve persons, and in all trials held in courts inferior to
the circuit court, or by any county, police, or city judge, or justice of
the peace, a jury shall consist of six persons; but the parties to any
action or prosecution, except for felony, may agree to a trial by a less
number of persons than is provided for in this section."
'Murphy v. Com. 58 Ky. 365 (1858); Tyra v. Com. 59 Ky. 1,
(1859); Phipps v. Com., 205 Ky. 832, 266 S. W. 651 (1924).
2 0 9 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489, (1925).
*OJackson v. Com. 221 Ky. 823, 299 S. W. 983 (1927); McPerkins
v. Com.236 Ky. 528, 33 S. W. (2d) 622 (1930).
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into whether jury trial is a personal privilege or is a fundamental part of the frame of government. The recent case of
Patton v. United States is most persuasive in holding that it is
a privilege. 3 7 There is good authority to the effect that the right
of jury trial is part of the frame of government which the defendant cannot waive. 38 Yet the modern trend is toward the
conclusion that the defendant may waive, for the right to jury
trial is a personal privilege.
Upon the assumption that right to trial by jury is a personal privilege, should not the defendant waive in felony cases
as well as in misdemeanor cases? The Constitution makes no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in this regard;
and the general principles underlying the "power" to waive
is the same in felony and misdemeanor cases. 39 Satisfactory
results might be reached by amending section 2252 of the Kentucky Statutes, so as to remove the exception as to felonies.
However, the Model Code provision should be enacted for the
courts would then have the benefit of the careful consideration
of the whole problem by the American Law Institute, and the
benefit of the decisions in other states, since the section, as written, will be and has been adopted in various jurisdictions. The
American Law Institute clause stating that "such waiver shall
be made in open court and entered of record is advisable in
order to guarantee that the defendant shall make his waiver
affirmatively, willingly, and understandingly.' '40

Section 312. TRIAL WnmRE JonT DEFENDANTS.
"When two or more defendants are charged with any offense,
whether felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried jointly, unless the
court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any
defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the
court may order that one or more defendants be each separately tried
and the others jointly tried, or may order that several defendants be
jointly tried in one trial and the others jointly tried in another trial
or trials, or may order each defendant be separately tried."

Briefly, the American Law Institute section states that two
-281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, (1930).
nCanemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128 (1858).
"21 Kentucky Law Journal 1, (27), "Constitutionality of Waiver
in Kentucky", Prof. Roy Moreland, (1933).
11Idem, page 28.
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or more persons charged with an offense will be tried jointly at
the discretion of the court.
The Kentucky situation of joinder of defendants in criminal cases is determined by section 237 of the Kentucky Criminal Code, .which reads as follows: "If two or more defendants
be jointly indicted for a felony any defendant is entitled to a
separate trial." The language of this section is mandatory as
to the right of a defendant, jointly indicted with another or
others for a felony, to a separate'trial. The court is without
power to refuse it to him when demanded. At common law the
Commonwealth alone in all cases had the right to elect whether
to try jointly or separately defendants jointly indicted, subject
to the discretion of the court. The Code changed the common
law to the extent of also allowing a defendant in cases of joint
indictment for a felony the right to demand and have a separate
trial. 41
41 "With reference to the matter discussed by us several days ago,
I am very strongly of the opinion that one of the most helpful things
that could be done to improve criminal procedure in Kentucky, would
be the passage of an act by the Legislature permitting defendants,
who are jointly indicted in felony cases, to be tried together, with the
right given to the presiding judge to grant the separate trial if, in the
exercise of his discretion, a separate trial is necessary in order to
give a fair trial to the parties.
"It seems useless, expensive and an ineffective thing to do that,
in a case where defendants are jointly indicted for felony, for the
Commonwealth must present the same witnesses in each of several
trials, with a new jury for each trial, and the result is often a miscarriage of justice.

"I recall especially one case where two men were indicted and
charged with the theft of a lot of tobacco. The evidence for the
Commonwealth showed the theft of the tobacco and that the two defendants together took it by truck to a warehouse, the tobacco so sold
being identified as the stolen tobacco. The defendants demanded, and
as a matter of right, received a separate trial. Upon the first trial
the defendant being tried testified that he was standing on the street
and that the other defendant came along in the truck with the tobacco
and asked him to ride to the warehouse and help him unload it, and
that he was entirely ini-ocent in the transaction. Upon the later trial
of the other defendant he told the same story, i. e., that he was standing on the street and the defendant, who was the first tried, came
along in the truck with the tobacco and asked him to go along and
help unload it. Had these cases been tried together the jury could
have determined which of the defendants was telling the truth, or
could have reached the conclusion, which I think was the truth, that
both of them were actually engaged in the theft of the tobacco; yet,
upon separate trials, there was sufficient doubt thrown in the minds
of the jury as to make a conviction difficult.
"If you can do anything toward having our Code of Criminal
Practice amended so as to make possible the joint trial for defendants
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The practice of allowing separate trials under the Kentucky Code section mentioned above has met with widespread
disapproval from many of the best lawyers and jurists of the
state. These eminent servants of justice are convinced that
the present practice is a waste of time, money, and a means of
miscarriage of justice. As for one prominent Commonwealth's
attorney, ."It seems useless, expensive and an ineffective thing
to do that (allow separate trials), for the Commonwealth must
present the same witnesses in each of several trials, with a new
jury for each trial, and the result is often a miscarriage of jus42
tice."
The granting of separate trials to joint defendants generally grew out of the desire to prevent deficiency of jurors. "The
practice of trying separately persons jointly indicted grew out
of the public inconvenience resulting from the exercise by
each joint defendant of his several right to challenge jurors
peremptorily. Each of them was entitled to the same number
that the law accorded him on trial of a separate offense, it was
found that the venire and tales were frequently exhausted, and
the great delay and serious public inconvenience were produced
thereby, trials being at times prevented from this deficiency of
jurors at the same assizes; and hence the plan of the crown's
having separate trials, in case the joint defendants would not
agree to join in their peremptory challenges, was adopted in
furtherance of public justice." 43
That is saying that the reason for allowing separate trials is
to prevent deficiency of jurors. Apparently section 237, allowing joint defendants in felony cases to have separate trials as a
matter of right, had for its purpose the prevention of deficiency
of jurors. Yet it is a fact that even if section 237 is repealed,
thereby not allowing joint defendants to claim as a matter of
right a separate trial in a felony case, the end of prevention of
deficiency of jurors is still attained. By way of elucidation we
see that section 198 of the Kentucky Criminal Code provides
who are jointly indicted in felony cases, you will have made a substantial contribution to the enforcement of law in this State." Letter
to the authors from James Park, Commonwealth's Attorney for Fayette
County.
-Hoffman v. Cor. 134 Ky. 726, 121 S. W. 690 (1909); Drake v.
Com. 214 Ky. 147, 282 S. W. 1066 (1926).
4'Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 So. 865 (1893).
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that "When several defendants are tried together, the challenge
of any one of the defendants shall (must) be considered the
challenge of all." The defendants are thereby forced to join
in their peremptory challenges, i. e., all of the defendants are entitled in the aggregate to not exceeding three and in felonies to
not exceeding fifteen peremptory challenges. Thence, in the
absence of section 237, there would arise no situation where the
joint defendants in the felony case could. each have fifteen peremptory challenges, and where a deficiency of jurors might
result. Since a deficiency of jurors is now prevented by the
code section 198, another provision, namely 237 allowing the
defendant to have a separate trial as a matter of right, is unnecessary and superfluous.
Thus the above model provisions of the American Law Institute Code may technically and constitutionally be adopted
into our Criminal Code. It is submitted that these provisions
will make for more effective criminal justice in Kentucky.

